RESUMEN
We provide a game-theoretical epidemiological model for the COVID-19 pandemic that takes into account that: (1) asymptomatic individuals can be contagious, (2) contagion is behavior-dependent, (3) behavior is determined by a game that depends on beliefs and social interactions, (4) there can be systematic biases in the perceptions and beliefs about the pandemic. We incorporate lockdown decisions by the government into the model. The citizens' and government's beliefs can exhibit several biases that we discuss from the point of view of behavioral economics. We provide simulations to understand the effect of lockdown decisions and the possibility of "nudging" citizens in the right direction by improving the accuracy of their beliefs.
Asunto(s)
COVID-19 , COVID-19/epidemiología , Control de Enfermedades Transmisibles , Economía del Comportamiento , Gobierno , Humanos , PandemiasRESUMEN
Behavioural economics (a combination of economics and psychology) provides keys to understand decisions made by politicians and citizens along the COVID-19 pandemic through the so-called cognitive biases. These biases can be offset by implementing behavioural interventions named "nudges" in order to promote responsible behaviours in the "new normality". This paper analyses, from a behavioural economics perspective, past, present and future of behavioural aspects surrounding the pandemic. Besides, this paper proposes different ways to formalize nudges according to law, which needs the fulfilment of three minimum requirements, namely: transparency, non-arbitrariness and efficiency. Furthermore, it is also suggested that protocols and contingency plans are set up to face future pandemics, in which both soft (nudge-type) interventions and hard legal regulations play different roles but complementary ones. Nudges can be implemented in a fast and less coercive way, so they are particularly suitable for changing mild misbehaviour, reserving legal sanctions for the more serious ones.